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I. INTRODUCTION
Veneration for the Constitution is a staple of American
political culture, as is vigorous debate about the meaning of
specific terms. Yet events of recent years have raised pointed
questions about the Constitution's viability: is it truly welladapted in today's world for delivering on the promises of its
Preamble; or is it, rather, maladapted, ineffective, and obsolete?
Does the Constitution adequately describe how we are actually
governed; and, if not, need we be concerned?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Short of formal amendment, the common way to remedy
perceived defects of the Constitution has been by shifts in
interpretation. The Supreme Court has done this on many
occasions, with varying political impact. Some of these shifts
focused on personal rights, others on governmental powers. Some
were enabled by transformative Court appointments, but others
reflected shifts in opinion prompted by dramatic national and
world events or successful political movements. AJl were able to
draw support from scholarship that criticized the previously
dominant interpretations. Perhaps the most significant shift was
the abandonment in the 1930s of doctrines that had severely
restricted both governmental regulation of the economy and
broad delegations of power by Congress to bureaucratic agencies.
A major consequence was a tremendous increase in the size of the
federal executive branch, the scope of its powers, and the money
it spends. These changes have aroused continued controversy as
to their wisdom, with some supporters and critics regarding them
as tantamount to constitutional-or unconstitutionalrevolution. The controversy, however, has played out largely in
political and academic discourse, not in the judiciary.
In recent years, the discourse has shifted in surprising ways.
6
As late as 1988, Sanford Levinson's Constitutional Faith sought
to find coherent meaning in a close and reverential reading of the
Constitution's text. By 2006, Levinson was calling for a new
Convention to remedy its profound defects. 7 Other scholars,
however, see no need for formal amendment or replacement.
Instead, they contrive to find in the Constitution, as it stands,
principles and virtues wildly different from the familiar literal
readings and traditional understandings. The conventional
discourse shows signs of exhaustion.
This essay considers three recent books that boldly but
differently defend remarkably strong views of the powers our
Constitution bestows on the presidency: The Royalist Revolution,
by Eric Nelson; The Executive Unbound, by Eric Posner & Adrian
Vermeule; and Secrets and Leaks, by Rahul Sagar. All three come
from prestigious presses, with jacket blurbs from a diverse group
of prominent scholars. These may surprise, until we reflect that
veneration for the presidency has never been confined to a narrow
ideological faction. Presidents of all parties have consistently
6.
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appealed to it, argued for it before Congress and the courts, and
gained significant, often bipartisan support. Political leaders
deeply opposed to incumbent presidents have historically tended
to attempt capturing the office, not to weaken it.
Presidential powers, as Madison observed, thrive most
dangerously in times of war: "Of all the enemies to public liberty
war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded .... [T]he discretionary
power of the executive is extended .... No nation could preserve
its freedom in the midst of continual warfare."x Today, we find
ourselves in an era of permanent war, or at least its threshold. In
addition, Congress, the primary institutional check on executive
power, is held these days in unprecedented contempt. This
suggests the question, how far are we from outright (if elective
and term-limited) monarchy? The books at issue argue that in
effect we already have one, and it's a good thing, too. 9 (Full
disclosure: I have long argued that our Constitution imposes
lawful restraints on the president, withholding monarchical
powers. 10)
II. THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION
Eric Nelson's work is an intellectual history of the
presidency, exploring the views about monarchy of prominent
Americans during the colonial, revolutionary, and Constitutionframing eras. His thesis is that pre-revolutionary colonists loved
and admired the king, whose predecessors had chartered their
colonies and granted them substantial self-rule. When Parliament
began to impose new taxes and commercial regulations, they saw
this as usurping the king's prerogatives, and looked to him, the
foremost guardian of the rights of British subjects, to preserve
their liberties. Only after he ignored their many pleas did they
turn against him and pursue independence. While some thereafter
11
followed Thomas Paine's lead in Common Sense, opposing
anything that smacked of monarchy and adopting "whiggish"
State constitutions with feeble executives, "royalist" leaders like
Ben Franklin, James Wilson, John Adams and Alexander
Hamilton adhered to the view that the British monarchy had in
X.
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10. See infra notes 21,25 & 27.
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Wooded.,

2003).
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fact proven too weak, and that a strong republic would require an
extremely powerful executive. At the Constitutional Convention,
Nelson claims, they prevailed. "The very same principles that had
underwritten the patriot campaign to rebalance the imperial
constitution in favor of the Crown demanded in 1787 the creation
of a recognizably Royalist constitution for the new United States"
(p. 7).
In support, Nelson offers a raft of letters, pamphlets,
sermons, etc., from colonists that extol the blessings of
monarchical "prerogative," placing these in the context of
ongoing debates about the flaws of the British Constitution as the
source of the colonies' increasing plight. These writers often
denounced the corruption of Parliament and/or their lack of
representation therein, even while debating competing theories of
representation and different views of the limits of Parliament's
power to legislate concerning the colonies. Some highlighted the
tyranny over Britain of the Long Parliament after the execution
of Charles I, hailing the Stuart Restoration as a return to more
balanced government, but lamenting the incompleteness of the
restored prerogative, in that the king's veto power had fallen into
disuse. Colonists repeatedly reproached George III for failing to
veto the laws to which they objected.
Nelson takes issue with scholars who have dismissed
arguments like these as perhaps insincere and self-serving, aimed
at justifying actions whose real motives were different. He shows
that this "royalist" line of thought survived the advent of
independence and had some influence on later constitutionmaking. His depiction of the Constitution of 1787 as a triumph of
royalism, however, falls seriously short. It is utterly clear the
colonists' arguments, however sincere, were context-driven, and
that none offered a coherent theory of representation or of
legitimacy capable of persuading modern readers who believe in
majority rule, local self-government, equal human dignity or a
fundamental right to vote. All seem to have accepted the obsolete
concept of "virtual representation," though differing on its
rationale, and many agreed that the colonies were outside the
"realm" of Parliament's jurisdiction, governed only as the
personal "dominion" of the king. These viewpoints are simply
irrelevant to a proper understanding of presidential powers under
the U.S. Constitution.
The terminology of the documents can be confounding to
readers today. Quite often, statements seem incoherent or
inconsistent with other views of the speaker. For example, we
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commonly think of the powers of Parliament and of "the Crown"
as mutually exclusive. Yet in 1621 we find Lord Baltimore
opposing proposed legislation regarding Virginia by arguing that
"if Regall Prerogative have power in any thinge it is this ...
Virginia is not annex't to the Crowne of England And therefore
not subject to the Lawes of this Howse [of commons]'' (p. 39).
Nelson does wonders trying to make sense of his materials, but
one may doubt sometimes whether they really do make sense, or
whether his interpretations are the only ones plausible.
Nelson launches his account with a confusing 1775 debate in
Parliament, where the wisdom of Coercive Acts against the
colonies became entangled with the question whether to
commemorate the "martyrdom" of Charles I. The Whig John
Wilkes opposed both measures and depicted the colonists as
sharing his opposition to royal prerogative rule. Yet Lord North
mocked Wilkes for joining the colonists, who he claims were
advocating Tory principles that extended prerogative across the
ocean, while halting parliamentary authority at the shore.
Nelson's summary, in turn, places the colonists even to the right
of 1775 Tories, "drifting perilously close to Jacobitism" (p. 31).
The history reviews numerous occasions where colonists pleaded
the constitutional theories of "dominion" and royal prerogative
mentioned above. Jefferson and John Dickinson were significant
exceptions, in that they, while agreeing that Parliament had
overreached its powers, voiced concern also at the prospect of
unbridled royal tyranny and rejected the Jacobite nostalgia
expressed by others. George III's determination to defend and
enforce the laws passed by Parliament made these constitutional
debates largely moot, but Nelson, anticipating the Declaration of
Independence, argues paradoxically that in denouncing there
only the king and ignoring Parliament, patriots only reaffirmed
"their continuing attachment to the neo-Stuart theory of empire"
(p. 65).
The next step examines more closely the contending concepts
of representation espoused by patriots. On one view, that term
required a body whose composition reflected that of the whole
12
people. Hanna Pitkin, in The Concept of Representation,
presented this as John Adams's view. Nelson, however, maintains
that Adams's focus was on authorization: the people had a right
to erect any government they wished, including a hereditary
limited monarchy, which would then be "the representative of the
12.
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whole nation, for the management of the executive power" (p.
67). Still, it is clear that Adams strongly endorsed the principles
of separation of powers and rule of law. It was the inclusion of
these in the British system that enabled him to call that system a
"republic." Those principles seem incompatible with a concept of
prerogative in the sense of rule outside the law.
Whether or not the king could represent them, patriots were
agreed that Parliament did not. None, of course, were advocates
of the modern norm of universal suffrage. They accepted the idea
that members of Parliament "virtually" represented even voteless
inhabitants of Britain. But here they parted ways: some simply
insisted that the colonists had never authorized Parliament to
represent them. Others argued that voting was a necessary
condition for authorization, and the colonists had no votes for
Parliament. Some went so far as to assert that "one could only be
said to have authorized a representative for whom one had voted"
(p. 70), raising thorny questions about whether those who might
abstain or vote for the losing side are represented. No adequate
theory of representation emerges here-least of all Nelson's
royalist theory of representation through royal prerogative.
Oddly absent is the slogan, "No taxation without representation,"
and the history of demands made and later retracted for seats in
Parliament, amidst occasional British offers of same. That omitted
tale leaves an impression that "no taxation" was the only point on
which the colonists were clear and united.
Next, Nelson focuses on the impact of Paine's Common
Sense. Paine's attack on the evils of monarchy revived an old
debate regarding two Old Testament passages on the
appropriateness of that institution for the Hebrews. The passages,
from Deuteronomy and Samuel, respectively, appear to look both
ways. On one interpretation, they can be reconciled by focusing
on the contingent vice of unbridled discretion; on the other, by
citing the inherent vice of idolatry, of bowing before man rather
than God. Nelson places Common Sense firmly in the second
camp, where prerogative is not the issue. Thus, the republican
turn sparked by Paine could accommodate the essence of the
royalism of other patriots, which was prerogative power and not
the trappings of monarchy. Nelson acknowledges in passing that
Paine himself was always "a committed opponent of prerogative
power" (p. 144 n. 182), but ends the section with an approving
reference to John Adams's 1789 characterization of the new
Constitution as "a monarchical republic, or if you will, a limited
monarchy" (p. 145).
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Nelson's review of state constitution-making from 1776 to
1780 shows that many states had vigorous debates over executive
powers, and the veto power in particular. In general, the whiggish
opponents of prerogative prevailed. The "royalists," though, for
the most part (Franklin excepted) adhered to their convictions
and bided their time. Adams, who had consistently maintained
that a republic must be "an Empire of Laws and not of Men" (p.
161), now advocated for the states a relatively strong governor,
endowed with the veto and "the whole Executive Power," yet
limited to three one-year terms in office and, significantly,
divested "of most of those Badges of Domination call'd
Prerogatives" (p. 162). At first, only South Carolina accepted the
veto power. In contrast, Pennsylvania in 1776 opted for a
unicameral legislature and a subservient, plural executive. James
Wilson's movement to right the balance was successful in 1790;
New York had adopted a qualified veto power in 1777 and
Massachusetts had done so in 1780. Nelson sees the tide here
shifting back toward "sweeping prerogatives" (p. 177).
We come at last to the federal Constitution of 1787. The
Convention of that year was a response to perceived defects of the
Articles of Confederation. While its primary aim was creating a
stronger central government vis-a-vis the states, Nelson focuses
entirely on the creation of a new, separate executive branch. The
Virginia Plan, which largely set the Convention's agenda, had
simply called for a "National Executive" to be chosen by the
legislature, and endowed with authority to execute the laws and
the (unspecified) "Executive rights vested in Congress by the
Confederation." From the outset of debate, the structure and
powers of the executive were entangled with the method of its
selection-whether by Congress, popular vote, or otherwise.
James Wilson's proposal for a single executive, elected by the
people for a limited term and endowed with an "absolute
negative" (pp. 185-186), encountered objections on every score.
Randolph, Sherman, Dickinson and Franklin thought the plan
smacked of monarchy, while Hamilton thought the president
should serve for life or during good behavior. Wilson was obliged
to acknowledge that "he did not consider the Prerogatives of the
British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive
powers" (p. 189). The Convention ultimately rejected both
popular election and the absolute negative. The president's veto,
treaty and appointment powers were limited; his term was four
years, and he was made subject to impeachment.
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Nelson reviews the ratification debates, In which
Antifederalists continued criticizing the presidency, while
Federalists, and Hamilton in particular, defended it by depicting
its powers as less than those of either the British king or New
York's governor. Federalists made no public reference to a
"monarchical republic." In private, meanwhile, Convention
delegate Abraham Baldwin, according to Max Farrand's The
Framing of the Constitution of the United States, was writing: "Nor
did it appear that any Members in Convention had the least Idea
of insidiously laying the Foundation of a future l\1onarchy ....
But were unanimously guarded and firm against every Thing of
13
this ultimate Tendency."
According to Nelson, the leading Framers had fought to
establish "a transcendent chief magistrate, one who would stand
above faction .... " (p. 231 ), and drafted "a recognizably Royalist
constitution, investing its chief magistrate with the very same
prerogative powers that Charles I had defended against the great
whig heroes of the seventeenth century" (p. 232). I would suggest,
however, that no president, including Washington, has succeeded
in standing above faction. Moreover, had the Federalists openly
avowed their Constitution as royalist, it would not have been
ratified. If we began with a royalist Constitution, then, it was a
work of stealth.
The Royalist Revolution does not directly address current
issues in constitutional law, whether those about specific
presidential powers or broader questions about the binding force
of Framers' intent/original meaning. Given the gulf between
historians' and jurists' methods and concerns, this seems wise. Yet
Nelson's findings leave room for presidentialists to offer them in
support of expansive readings of presidential power, including
arguments that presidents have "inherent power" to act outside
of or even against the law. Nelson's work does not and cannot
support such arguments. While some delegates to the Convention
were admirers of what they saw as the British constitution, they
could not have copied it if they chose, for Britain had no written
constitution. Patriots' various, shifting and conflicting
conceptions of "prerogative," "representation," or even
"republican" were not debated, let alone codified and ratified. By
1800, the High Federalist views of Hamilton and Adams were

13. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING
162 (1lJ13).
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mocked and rejected. The Constitution as we know it reflects
Madison's insight that power corrupts.
III. THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND
Eric Posner and Adrian V ermeule focus on the special
demands of the modern administrative state, in which, they
maintain, competence and power belong overwhelmingly to the
executive branch, and the traditional, legalistic checks and
balances of the "Madisonian republic" are obsolete. Congress and
the courts now play essentially reactive and marginal roles. The
authors are quite comfortable with this state of affairs, since it is
essential to effective government.
They begin with a sharp critique of "liberal legalism"- the
view that law does and should constrain the executive. The reality,
they hold, is that in the modern administrative state, such legal
constraints are "shaky in normal times and weak or nonexistent
in times of crisis" (p. 4). For this point they draw upon the legal
thought of Carl Schmitt, the "crown jurist of the Third Reich," 14
though they reject his contempt for democracy. Schmitt has grown
remarkably popular of late, with 420 law review citations since the
year 2000. Schmitt argued that the pace and complexity of modern
life pose challenges that legislatures and courts are institutionally
incapable of managing.
The chief reasons for the failure of liberal legalism to
constrain executive power are emergency and delegation. Why
Schmitt's authority is essential for these points is not obvious. The
Weimar Constitution that Schmitt deplored expressly provided
for its suspension by the executive during emergencies; ours does
not. If constitutions matter, that would be an advantage for the
U.S. system. Delegation, the authors say, flowed inevitably from
the size and complexity of the tasks entrusted to modern
government during and since the New Deal, tasks which Congress
could not but delegate to a growing bureaucracy. Early judicial
resistance to delegation withered after 1937. Wars and economic
emergencies have prompted further, sweeping assertions of
executive power. While Congress has enacted a number of
framework statutes aiming to limit and oversee executive
discretion, these have proven largely ineffective in the face of
complexity, secrecy, and collective action problems that weaken
Congress and the courts. Even when laws are clearly violated,
14.

See Charles E. Frye, Carl Schmitt's Concept of the Political, 2X J. POL. XIX (1966).
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there is often no effective remedy available. Yet, the authors
insist, the election system forces politicians to maintain their
popularity and credibility and to submit to extraordinary scrutiny
by a highly educated population. Politics and publilc opinion thus
supply sufficient nonlegal constraints on executive power: "The
administrative state generates the cure for its own ills" (p. 14).
There follows a powerful, extended critique of Madison's
theories of separated powers and checks and balances. First, he
wrongly predicted that officeholders' ambitions would generally
lead them to vigorously defend the powers of their current office.
Second, his assumption that Congress and the courts will monitor
the workings of the executive has been rendered obsolete by the
increased complexity and scale of the latter. Third, the legislative
and judicial processes are too cumbersome to keep pace with the
policymaking of the modern administrative state, to which so
much power is necessarily delegated.
The first point rests on several aspects of the collective action
problem: many members of Congress will be loyal to the president
as their party leader; many will see his leadership as essential in
times of crisis; and (my own point) not a few may themselves hope
to be president one day. In short, the interests of a congressman
do not always coincide with the powers of that place. Second,
congressional monitoring is hindered by scant resources, lack of
expertise and entrenched secrecy. The judiciary labors under
similar disadvantages; while a few famous cases have announced
checks on executive power, these have been the exception and not
the rule.
Posner & V ermeule illustrate their case with detailed
accounts of two crises: 9/11 and the 2008 financial crash. After
9/11, Congress quickly enacted measures delegating broad new
powers to the administration, though not everything it had
requested. Litigation on the scope of these delegated powers, as
well as the additional, inherent powers repeatedly claimed by the
administration, eventually produced three Supreme Court
decisions that, although they ruled against the government on a
number of narrow points, in practice left its hands virtually untied
regarding its indefinite detention and surveillance programs. The
financial crisis yielded a similar mix of unilateral executive actions
and largely successful requests for expansions of delegated power,
which could then be given extremely sweeping interpretations by
the Bush and Obama administrations. For the authors, the
legislative role in these episodes exhibited little Madisonian
deliberation and self-regard, but ample signs of Schmittian
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helplessness. "[T]he executive asks to take three steps forward;
Congress, pushing back somewhat, has no choice but to allow it
to take two" (p. 45). Post hoc congressional oversight has been
relatively feeble-even, surprisingly, under conditions of divided
government; judicial review has been too late and too deferential
to make much difference. Insofar as courts eventually announce
limits to executive power, "the public will not take much notice of
those precedents, and they will have little sticking power when the
next crisis rolls around" (p. 54). On the other hand,
the sheer complexity of the government response to regulatory
problems limits the impact of a single person, and renders
inappropriate the use of words like "dictator" to describe the
president .... [A] large area of public policy is determined by
a self-replicating career bureaucracy . . . . The traditional
separation-of-powers model docs not, of course, capture this
phenomenon (p. 59).

The "unitary executive" theory is not mentioned.
The authors next offer a novel theory of constitutional
change. Contrary to Nelson's view, executive supremacy was not
inscribed in the 1787 Constitution; rather, the Madisonian
Constitution has profoundly changed via unorthodox routes.
Neither formal Article V amendment, judicial interpretation, nor
Ackerman's moments of "higher lawmaking" 15 could produce the
quantity and speed of constitutional change that a dynamic polity
demands. Formal amendment is unwieldy and rare, and many
serious constitutional questions go unlitigated. Ackerman's
"moments," meanwhile, are vaguely defined, yet surely too
infrequent to supply the needed, routine, medium-size
adjustments. Instead, constitutional change occurs through
interbranch "showdown" conflicts mediated by public opinion"a special kind of politics accompanied by legalized rhetoric" (p.
63). "Constitutional conflict over the distribution of policymaking
authority is continual and ubiquitous" (p. 66).
The authors' first example of these showdowns is
impeachments, which, they claim, "inevitably create precedents"
(p. 63). They describe Lincoln's unpunished defiance of a habeas
decree as "a (nonjudicial) constitutional precedent" (p. 69). With
legalism repudiated, it is unclear just what "precedent" or
"constitutional" are to mean, beyond describing successful
15.

See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991 ); 2 BRUCE
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (199X); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE

ACKERMAN,

THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION

(2014).
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political actions. Indeed, they acknowledge that important
precedents often continue to be controversial. However, if one
branch totally or partially acquiesces in the actions of another, this
can create "a political precedent couched in constitutional terms"
(p. 71) that may have "some positive force in decision making
during later periods" (p. 72). Rational actors, after all, must weigh
the benefits of following precedent against the costs.
Often, say the authors, disagreements about the allocation of
constitutional authority are settled in the short term by the force
of public opinion. The influence of "public constitutional
sentiment" is felt when a showdown threatens to paralyze the
government, rousing important elites, interest groups and others
to attention. Then, the competing claimants to authority must
assess their respective degrees of public support in order to decide
how far to press their positions. The authors acknowledge that
public constitutional sentiment is not necessarily profound or
even intelligent, yet its indirect influence legitimates the outcome
under our "plebiscitary constitution." Whether or not the
competing views are based on "good-faith interpretation of
relevant texts and traditions," somehow the prevailing view will
reflect "more fundamental, quasi-constitutional instincts than the
views that prevail in ordinary politics" (p. 78).
Now, Ackerman identifies the 1936 election as a
constitutional moment. My father, who had a law degree, voted
for FDR in that election. When I asked him whether he was
thereby endorsing FDR's theory of federal power under the
Constitution, he responded, "He was a good guy. I wanted to give
him a chance." In The Executive Unbound's remarkable extension
of Ackerman's theory, the public voice is heard without holding a
single election; nor is it ascertained through opinion polls. Their
hypothetical example, in which Congress wants to end a war and
the president wants to continue it, raises the question: what
chance is there that actual public opinion would be based on views
of the two branches' constitutional authority, as opposed to the
wisdom of the war itself? In short, "public constitutional
sentiment" is probably a political fiction, akin to virtual
representation. Nelson offered us constitutional creation by
stealth; here we have constitutional reform by stealth.
Posner & Vermeule go on to examine "framework statutes"
designed to constrain executive power, such as the War Powers
Resolution, the National Emergencies Act, the Inspector General
Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. All but the last are
declared to be relatively or even utterly ineffective, due to
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congressional laxity in using their override provisions and in
punishing violations of their various requirements. Presidents and
Congresses alike know that in cases of showdown, by and large
"the public will be unlikely to care too much about the legal
niceties" (p. 88)- a statement in sharp tension with that quoted
above from page 78. As for the AP A, while it does impose some
constraints on executive agencies in normal times, it does not
apply to the President himself, exempts a range of national
security affairs, and is not strictly enforced by the courts in
situations of perceived emergency. Such APA terms as ''agency,"
"agency action," "military or foreign affairs functions,"
"committed to agency discretion," and "for good cause," as
interpreted by the courts, leave many important decisions outside
the checking powers of other branches.
Anticipating legalist objections that their theory of
constitutional change makes the rule of law a mere fa~ade, the
authors assure us that
Candor is not always desirable, and hypocritical lip-service to
the rule of law may even be best for the (thick) rule of law in
the long run .... The best way to preserve those norms or
values may be to draw a veil of decency over behavior that
everyone knows is going on (p. 103).

They do not make clear in what sense "everyone knows" what is
going on, or knows that escape hatches from liberal legalism are
a Schmittian necessity, or in what "thick" sense these escape
hatches preserve the rule of law. Nor do they show how, in the
absence of candor, public constitutional sentiment can validly
referee charges of unlawful executive action.
The authors' account of the real, effective constraints on the
executive begins with a broad, remarkably sanguine statement:
Through its long history and all of its wars and crises, the U.S.
government has generally been responsive to the public
interest, and has always ranked as a leader among countries
around the world in ... democratic responsiveness and civil
liberties. And American practices in these respects have only
improved over the decades and centuries, during the same
period in which the separation of powers has eroded (p. 113).

This claim is documented by a single comparative political science
source that relies on a few objective indicators. Its assumed
validity is then explained by reference to the election and party
systems, and by the political culture's allegedly deep distrust of
executive power. Elections allow the public to remove leaders
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whose conduct does not serve their interest; hence the ubiquity of
elections, it is said, in the worlds of business, universities, and
government-as if all of these domains were democratically
governed. The national election system is admittedly flawed by
rent-seeking and lack of voter information, but the authors do not
see that the separation of powers is a necessary or sufficient cure
for such flaws. In any event, it opens the door for gridlock that
makes the system unworkable-thus, there seems to be "a general
sense among the political elites that the erosion of separation of
powers has not been a bad thing" (p. 120). Despite the distrust of
executive power, it is Congress that takes the blame for gridlock.
The concentration of power in the executive, they maintain,
has actually resulted in the advancement of our liberty. Presidents
must strive to maintain popularity and credibility, and so the
16
public's (undocumented) commitment to civilliberties obliges
them to act accordingly. Presidents know the voters' "ultimate"
preferences, which are assumed to be fixed; presuJnably, support
for liberty is such a preference, though support for separation of
powers is not. Well-motivated or not, presidents use various
strategies to maintain credibility, so that their exercise of
discretion will be trusted. They know that excessive secrecy might
undermine this effort, and the authors assert, re1narkably, that
there is no evidence for such an excess. (Here they cite an article
17
by Rahul Sagar.) Presidents can purport to "bind themselves" by
relying (non-bindingly) on independent agencies and
commissions, bipartisan appointments, multilateral! engagements,
promises of transparency, or even, as a last resort, by requesting
express statutory authorization.
True, it is hard for the public to know whether the executive
is indeed well-motivated, but the risk that the public will fail to
trust a well-motivated president is just as serious as the opposite
risk. Trust is justified, because in general "[t]he president knows
the range of options available, their likely effects, their expected
costs and benefits-thanks to the resources and expertise of the
executive branch" (p. 130). If mistakes are made by a wellmotivated executive, it is only because "greater accuracy would
not have been cost-justified" (p. 131 ). These astoundingly
optimistic statements fit uneasily with certain more sober
comments: "Bush's policies in the war on terror might have been
16. See generally ROBERT MCCLOSKEY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF
TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 232-73 (19X3).
17. See Rahul Sagar, On Combating the Abuse of State Secrecy, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 404
(2007).
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optimal, insufficient, or excessive; we will not know for many
years, to whatever extent the fog of history will allow us to know
at all" (p. 135). There is, at least, "a middle range in which voters'
information and competence are high enough that the credibility
mechanisms are useful, but not so high that voters can just directly
assess whether the executive has good motivations and is adopting
optimal policies" (p. 152). At any rate, "the unchecked executive
is generally too weak to adopt abusive policies" (p. 153).
(Apparently, it is self-evident that the Iran-Contra affair, the
second Iraq War, and the Bush-Obama counterterrorism policies,
presumably motivated by sincere patriotism, do not count as
abuses.)
This account depicts an implausible world of highly
informed, entirely rational actors, where the public is united- not
polarized- around fixed and meaningful constitutional
sentiments. A benign, invisible hand operates in the political
sphere, so that government action is presumed to serve the public
interest, regardless of what is done and even regardless of the
laws. Our system of electoral accountability is not unduly
weakened or distorted by factors such as the electoral college,
gerrymandering, legal restrictions on voting, the electoral power
of money, subservient media, negative campaign ads, poor
schooling, public ignorance and apathy, hero worship, pervasive
secrecy, or the permanent bureaucracy (most of which are not
even mentioned). This fable seems grounded in theoretical law
and economics speculation, not empirical evidence. It ignores the
fact that, though unpopular presidents may have difficulty
obtaining desired legislation, they can still use executive orders
and the Commander-in-Chief power to undertake muscular
initiatives.
The authors next consider, and predictably reject, the
proposition that international law can be an additional check on
the American executive. While courts may regard human rights
treaties and the laws of war as binding in principle, experience
shows that the norms are vague and that violations generally have
no effective sanction. International bodies are weak, foreign
courts can rarely effectively intervene, and domestic courts are
almost always deferential to the executive. Occasional references
to foreign or international law in interpreting the United States
Constitution have proved highly controversial, and a number of
important treaties have failed of ratification or been saddled by
the Senate with weakening reservations. In sum, "global liberal
legalism seems like a rearguard action- an ideological effort to
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reconcile the new era of executive power with traditional notions
of rule of law" (p. 175).
The ensuing discussion of "tyrannophobia'" argues that
liberal legalism displays an exaggerated fear of tyranny, because
it overlooks the political constraints on executive power identified
above. Our country has never come close to a dictatorship, but
tyrannophobia likely deserves no credit for this good fortune.
Much discourse about tyranny is hyperbolic: occasional abuses of
power by an elected leader, or even time-limited dictatorships, do
not amount to true dictatorship. Moreover, even true dictatorship
need not be catastrophic for public welfare, in tenns of its social
and economic policies; though he is not mentioned here, one
senses the ghost of Schmitt nodding approvingly.
The authors trace tyrannophobia back to the founding era.
They state, contrary to Eric Nelson, that, along with Caesar and
Cromwell, 1ames II and George III were antirnodels for the
Framers. Colonists had exaggerated views of the king's actual
powers; the king, not Parliament, was the focus of the Declaration
of Independence. Post-revolutionary constitutions established
extremely weak executives, but experience with legislative
tyranny prompted a movement to strengthen the national
executive. After a prolonged stalemate, the Framers created an
independent executive, vested with vague, undefined powers,
whose limits would be subject to ongoing debate- including
about "the executive power to violate laws in order to protect the
nation" (p. 184 n. 31).
Over time, presidential power has shown a gradual upward
trend, punctuated by cyclical peaks and valleys. Wars, in
particular, expand presidential power, which contracts with the
return to peace. "Americans admire the military but the culture is
not militaristic" (p. 186). (Apparently, the authors are not familiar
with typical July 4 crowd celebrations.) Powerful presidents long
tended to be followed by weaker ones, perhaps due to political
backlash; yet the most powerful presidents, such as Lincoln and
FDR, have gained the approval of history. FDR's administration
was a watershed; since then, only Nixon's abuses-though
actually "pathetic stuff" (p. 200)-created a major backlash.
Is tyrannophobia a valuable, strong constraint on the
executive; an irrational, strong obstacle to needed institutional
change; or just insignificant rhetoric? Cross-national surveys
provide no evidence that tyrannophobia is more prevalent in
democracies; rather, it is general demographic variiables, such as
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wealth and its distribution, education, and ethnic and linguistic
homogeneity, or else overlapping social cleavages, that
distinguish
democracies
from
non-democracies.
"The
contemporary United States is too wealthy, with a population that
is too highly educated, to slide into authoritarianism" (p. 193).
Even if tyrannophobia was justified at the Founding, today it is
"an element of the broader paranoid style in American politics"
(p. 195). The erosion of legal checks and the overlooking of
political checks on the presidency (which have actually grown
stronger) drive ongoing, irrational distrust. "The modern
presidency is a fishbowl ... [to] a wealthy, educated population
and a super-educated elite whose members have the leisure and
affluence to care about matters such as civil liberties, who are
politically engaged, and who help to check executive abuses" (pp.
201-202). Even so, "There is no evidence that tyrannophobia
deters low-level executive abuse ... for an educated and leisured
population, and the regular cycle of elections, will themselves
check executive abuses" (pp. 203-204). A very puzzling footnote
adds: "We do not claim, however, that we live in the best of all
possible worlds. When the executive engages in abuses, legal or
constitutional reform may be justified" (p. 204 n. 96). Here they
cite certain legalist reform proposals, tx though, in view of their
antilegalist stance, they cannot endorse the necessity or efficacy
of same.
The book concludes with several reassuring remarks:
Congress retains the power to make laws, regulate the
bureaucracy and create independent agencies; declarations of
emergency and actions taken thereunder must face the prospect
of withering public skepticism; post-Watergate governments will
not dare to target and monitor political opponents. Each of these
claims invites rebuttal, based respectively on gridlock; the wars in
Iraq and Libya; and FBI surveillance of environmental and
Occupy activists, plus unprecedented prosecutions for leaking.
The Executive Unbound's account of the desuetude of legal
checks on executive power is persuasive and disturbing. The
argument for sufficient political constraints, however, is abstract
and empirically flimsy; the ease of propagating an overwhelming
sense of emergency makes those constraints especially fragile.
Finally, the admiring use of the ideas of the unrepentant Nazi Carl
Schmitt is, to say the least, in very questionable taste.
1K See Sanford Levinson & Jack Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and
Design, Y4 MINN. L. REV. 17XY, 1 X5X (2010).
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IV. SECRETS AND LEAKS
Rahul Sagar's Secrets and Leaks is a narrowly focused paean
to executive secrecy regarding foreign and military affairs. His
heroes among the American founders are largely those Nelson
identifies as the leading, royalist Framers of the Constitution- in
particular, Wilson, Hamilton and Adams. The book is timely, in
view of debates about alleged abuses connected with the War on
Terror, the invasion of Iraq, and the massive leaks by Chelsea
Manning and Edward Snowden. It is well written and copiously
footnoted, with an extensive bibliography of historical, legal and
political science sources.
Sagar emphasizes the difficulty of designing an effective
regulatory framework to prevent the abuse of state secrecy. "[S]o
long as there is state secrecy, our ability to guard against its misuse
depends not so much on the checks and balances established by
the Constitution as on the virtues and vices of those men and
women who secretly take the law into their own hands in order to
either open our eyes or close our minds" (p. 7). This premise is
reminiscent of the antilegalist approach of Posner & Vermeule,
though it speaks of personal virtue rather than political
calculations. Despite this discounting of constitutional checks, the
author proceeds to place the Constitution at the heart of the
dilemma. The crucial aspect of the Constitution is the sweeping
powers it vests in the president, on whose virtue we must then
depend.
To support the proposition that the Framers subscribed not
to a "principle of disclosure" but instead to one of secrecy, Sagar
cites "republican" writers from Renaissance Italy and the
absolutist Stuart monarchy, who taught that the state's flourishing
in a world of international and domestic conflict depends on a
regular and secure practice of secrecy. The capaciousness of his
use of "republican" is evident in the book's opening epigram-a
quote from Machiavelli's The Prince. 19 Machiavelli indeed taught
that "virtu" was the prime ingredient for princely success, and the
sole restraint on his actions. That thinker returns only on the final
page, where Sagar exhorts us to "forgo platitudinous calls for
'transparency' and quixotic endeavors to tame 'the prince"' (p.
204); yet his spirit is evident throughout.

19. NICCOLO MACIIIAVELLI. TilE PRINCE (W.K. Marriott, trans., J.K. Dent & Sons
195X) ( 1515), available at https://chooks.adclaidc.cdu.au/m/machiavclli/niccolo/m149p/
complctc.html.
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Expounding the constitutional separation of powers, the
author argues that only the executive is endowed with the
information, unity and energy needed to make national security
decisions wisely and quickly, and to keep them confidential.
Sharing the relevant information with Congress is unsafe, since
individual members are prone to leak secrets confided to them,
even when the body ordains secrecy. Thus, disclosure to Congress
cannot be deemed constitutionally required. Courts, meanwhile,
lack expertise and must be deferential when national security is at
stake.
After convincingly showing, through many episodes over the
years, that "neither Congress nor the courts have intervened
strongly" against excesses of executive secrecy (p. 48), the author
goes on to argue, reminiscent of Posner & Vermeule, that they are
structurally incapable of doing so. Due to want of information, of
incentives and of effective sanctions, they cannot reliably compel
disclosure. Where national security is concerned- and Sagar
insists that it is for the president alone to determine when this is
the case- the separation of powers is hopelessly ineffective.
Besides, he argues, it is a luxury we cannot afford; the other
branches have wisely accepted doctrines such as the state secrets
privilege and executive privilege, recognizing that "necessity
knows no law" (p. 82). In the end, it seems, those doctrines are
grounded more in perceived necessity than in the constitutional
text.
Sagar challenges critics of secrecy to prove that, overall, the
harms caused by abuses of secrecy exceed those caused by
unauthorized disclosures (p. 93). Having deftly shifted the burden
of proof to the other side, he needs to say little about the harms
or benefits of the many secrets and leaks he offers as examples.
Instead, he falls back upon the claim that, because the other
branches lack the expertise and institutional capacity to keep
secrets, mandated sharing of information with them cannot be
safe.
His historical and institutional analyses lead the author to the
very plausible conclusion that the most effective practical check
against abuses is the leaking of the secrets. This prompts a close
inquiry into the conduct of leakers and whistleblowers. Sagar
provides insightful analysis of the options, incentives and risks
that would-be leakers encounter. Unless the leaks are beneficial
to the president, prospects for the leaker are generally bleak,
suggesting that leaks might not be excessively common. Yet the
author offers a normative claim ostensibly based on democratic
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theory: Only the president is elected nationwide and empowered
to determine the national interest on behalf of the People; thus,
would-be leakers have no business substituting their judgment for
his.
Sagar repeatedly recognizes that secrecy can be abused, but
his vision of the virtuous presidency leads him to a very narrow
definition of abuse. Not just any unlawful act will qualify, but only
unlawful acts that deliberately pursue selfish rather than truly
national interests-as if presidents do not generally believe that
what is good for them is good for the country. Excluding Congress
and the public from vital decisions in which they have a right to
participate is not itself an abuse (pp. 127-130). Given this narrow
definition, the author easily concludes that, while on rare
occasions leaks may be necessary to expose the gravest abuses, for
the most part leaks are unjustified and potentially harmful. His
foremost worry is that leaks can sometimes cause gigantic
harms- which cannot themselves be publicly detailed, for fear of
causing even more damage. Necessarily, his examples are
hypothetical.
Though disabled from examining the motives and judgments
of secret-keepers, Sagar speculates at length about the possible
bad motives and judgments of leakers. By their "usurpation" of
the president's personal authority to determine what must be
secret (p. 114), leakers make themselves subject to criminal
sanctions, unless they can meet a stringent five-point test to justify
their conduct. The disclosure must (1) concern an abuse of public
authority, as narrowly defined; (2) there must be clear and
convincing evidence of wrongdoing (difficult or impossible to
come by); (3) the leak must not pose a disproportionate threat to
public safety (also hard to know); (4) the means of disclosure must
be the least drastic possible (publication to the world being the
most drastic); and (5), leakers must identify themselves and be
prepared to undergo the predictable formal and informal
sanctions. Thus, leakers must accept the burden of proving that
the president's motives were improper, and, in addition, of
proving that their own motives in leaking inforn1ation are not
biased by "sectional," "partisan," or "personal" motives.
The author's policy recommendations accordingly focus
primarily on steps to reduce the incidence of leaking. He is
skeptical of the Posner/Vermeule proposal that presidents
enhance their credibility by resorting to bipartisan appointments
and multilateral actions, since those steps will limit the president's
plenary control (pp. 189-191 ). Instead, he exhorts the press to

2015]

BOOK REVIEWS

631

employ greater self-restraint, and advocates for "an independent
and well-funded organization dedicated to scrutinizing media
performance, which could name and shame reporters and editors
who misuse anonymous sources, and the publishers who condone
such behavior" (p. 201 ).
Secrets and Leaks has the skilled rhetorical earmarks of a
carefully balanced argument; yet its positions on questions of
historical interpretation, constitutional theory and democratic
theory are extreme. Central here is the Machiavellian emphasis
on voter-determined presidential virtue as the sole and sufficient
safeguard.
For example, the author's treatment of the Founding period
is highly selective. Historians conventionally expound the conflict
in the 1790s between Hamilton and Madison over the risks and
benefits of executive power, concluding that the issues have
remained unresolved. Sagar, however, barely examines Madison's
side of the argument, using contributions by Hamilton and Jay to
The Federalist Paperl0 to characterize the Constitution as
profoundly Hamiltonian. While he provides ample evidence that
the Founders often resorted to secrecy, those actions alone cannot
establish valid legal precedents. Neither the full range of historical
21
facts nor the opposing interpretations developed by me and
22
23
other writers, such as Louis Fisher and Heidi Kitrosser, are
seriously addressed.
Sagar relies heavily on the so-called Jay Treaty precedent (as
24
did Chief Justice Burger in United States v. Nixon ), when George
Washington refused to share requested papers with the House of
Representatives, which nevertheless, moved by partisan loyalties
and fears of war, granted funds to implement the treaty. The
author seems unaware that this "precedent" was actually a
sudden, unilateral, politically motivated departure from the
previous practice, in which the president would forward requested
documents, but sometimes ask Congress to keep them
20.
21.

THE FEDERALIST Nos. 2-5 (John Jay), Nos. 69,70 (Alexander Hamilton).
See DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THI: FOUNDING
FATHERS: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 20-33 (19X1); Daniel N. Hoffman,

A Republic If You Can Keep It, X2 MICII. L. REV. 997 (19X4).
22. See LOUIS FISHER, IN TilE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 221, 253--62 (2006); LOUIS FISHER,
THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (2004).
23. See HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY,
EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 192-210 (2015); Heidi Kitrosser,
Classified Information I.eaks and Free Speech, 200X ILL. L. REV. XXl (200X).
24. United States v. Nixon, 41X U.S. 6X3 (1974).
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confidential. Moreover, the House formally protested this
innovation, and President John Adams soon repudiated it in the
XYZ Affair. Yet Sagar accepts on faith that George Washington
was virtuous, making it irresponsible to criticize his conduct. Nor
does he recognize how the ramming through of Jay's Treaty
exacerbated the partisan divide, leading to ongoing popular and
press protests that in turn provoked the notorious Sedition Law
of 1798. This dynamic of secrecy leading to protests leading to
repressive counter-reactions should serve as a cautionary
precedent in its own right. The historical account here also ignores
the fact that, even though the Federalists in the 1790s were
repeatedly outraged by leaks that they thought endangered their
"infant empire," none of the known miscreants was prosecuted.
Their Sedition Law did not criminalize leaking, but only
25
defamatory comments. Even so, it was unconstitutional by
26
modern standards, and Jefferson's election in 1800 might be
offered as another constitutional counterprecedent.
The author's more recent historical materials are extensive,
but equally selective. There is no close examination of the long
record of troublesome wars and treaties that we have entered
under the influence of secrets and lies. For exanaple, the roles
played by secrecy and deception in launching and prolonging our
Vietnam and Iraq wars are not assessed, because these are prime
examples of politically controversial actions about which the
president necessarily knows best. How could anyone be so
irresponsible as to question the "talents and integrity" of virtuous
leaders like George Washington and Dick Cheney (p. 187)? (The
term "war crimes," by the way, does not appear in the book.)
Sagar does show the great difficulty we have had in combatting
excesses of secrecy, but his materials do not support his claim that
"state secrecy is approved in principle and censured in practice"
(p. 49); rather, they suggest the opposite.
Though our Framers explicitly attempted to avoid the
tyranny of centralized power and to instill the rule of law, Sagar,
akin to Nelson, has them stealthily enshrining in the presidency a
sweeping principle of secrecy. His claim that the Framers allowed
the president a free hand on secrecy has no textual basis, and it
vitiates the separation of powers and the First Atnendment. To
capably perform their assigned roles, Congress, the courts, the

25. See Daniel N. Hoffman, Contempt of the United States: The Political Crime That
Wasn't, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 343, 347 (19X1 ).
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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press and the public often need access to information held by the
executive branch; yet he rejects the logical inference that each
must have a corresponding power or right to obtain it.
In particular, First Amendment protection for leaking is fully
consistent with the Amendment's text, the Founders' scruples,
and the novelty of prosecutions for leaking. Yet, despite having
shown that courts are unavoidably prone to defer to executive
power claims, Sagar confidently relies on a line of court decisions,
mostly quite recent, holding in effect that officials are properly
bound to secrecy: they are presidential servants, not free citizens.
Those decisions are vulnerable to strong criticism. 27
Only Daniel Ellsberg's unauthorized disclosures enabled us
to realize that our government had systematically used secrets and
lies to mobilize and sustain public support for a war of highly
questionable value. Yet the author sees no constitutional bar to
prosecutions for leaks under the 1917 Espionage Act-save
perhaps for those of journalists, which he acknowledges might
violate the freedom of the press (pp. 171-180). The notion that
Ellsberg (or Edward Snowden, whose story post-dates the book)
deserves to be honored and constitutionally protected from
prosecution seems unthinkable.
It is vital to recognize that governmental secrecy, both
literally and in every practical sense, is a prior restraint on speech.
Its entire purpose is to prevent anyone, including foreign enemies,
but also members of congressional oversight committees, courts,
the press, and voters, from learning of and responding to what the
government is doing or contemplating. By design, secrecy
systematically undermines official accountability, checks and
balances, and the rule of law. It accordingly deserves the same,
highest level of scrutiny applied to other forms of prior restraint.
There is no basis in the Constitution or democratic theory for
carving out a categorical national security exception to the First
Amendment. 2x In this domain too, the wisdom and justice of
policy depend on accurate information and a free marketplace of
ideas.
Giving broad discretion to the executive in the national
security domain can easily extend into other domains, and has in
fact done so, just as domestic executive powers have expanded in

27.

N. HOFFMAN, OUR ELUSIVE CONSTITUTION: SILENCES,
127-2X (I ()()7).
See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,742 (1Y71).
DANIEL
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tandem with international ones. As early as Marbury v. Madison,
the Court sought to distinguish between official actJlons pertaining
to foreign or defense affairs and disputes affecting individual
rights, with the former being matters of discretion and the latter
questions of law. Plainly, however, many actions fit into both
categories. That an action may serve national security does not
logically imply that no right is violated.
Moving beyond constitutional law, the democratic theory
Sagar invokes must envision a far more active, influential role for
the public than did classical republican theory, necessitating even
broader access to information. Yet he asserts, akin to Posner &
Vermeule, that leaking of secrets is very seldom warranted,
simply because our election system adequately ensures that
presidents will generally be virtuous. The pronounced variations
of presidential ability, as well as virtue, do not figure in this
argument. The author's strongly patriotic sentiments, reflected in
the book's dedication, "To these great and glorious United
States," somehow translate into veneration of the presidency as
an institution, almost regardless of the conduct of its occupantRichard Nixon's Watergate being the sole acknowledged
exception. Nixon, of course, believed that "when the President
30
does it, that means it can't be illegal." What if he had played the
national security card, as he considered doing, and destroyed his
tapes? Sagar's "democratic" theory is tantamount to making the
president sovereign, not the People. Here, stealth becomes not
just a feature attributed to constitutional adoption or change, but
the central principle of everyday governance.
Moreover, to argue as if the president personally made all
decisions on secrecy wrongly conflates executive power with
presidential power. Over one million officials currently have
power to classify documents wholesale, subject only to vague and
scarcely enforced standards, and presidents are easily misled by
classified briefings. The author acknowledges that these unelected
bureaucrats systematically favor secrecy over disclosure, and that,
indubitably, way too much information is classified: yet these facts
seem not to affect his weighing of risks and benefits and do not
figure in his "democratic" theory. Secrets and lies have clearly
played great roles in the decline of public trust in government in
l)

29. See generally Marhury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1H03).
30. Interview hy David Frost with Richard Nixon (May lX, 1977), available at
http://www.streetlaw.org/ en/Page/722/Nixons_ Yiews_on_Presidentiai_Power.
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recent decades.
blame this decline Rrimarily on irresponsible
leakers and publishers seems perverse.·
Sagar does endorse Jack Goldsmith's advice 32 that an
administration "should be as open as possible, and when secrecy
is truly necessary it must organize and conduct itself in a way that
is beyond reproach, even in a time of danger" (p. 188). Yet it is
difficult to show that this has generally been the case- or even
that it has ever been the case. Because it is hard to know what
officials have done, let alone why they did it, the author advises
that lawmakers, judges, and the press must "refrain from picking
sides" (p. 202). Yet picking sides is central to both democratic
politics and the judicial process. By not picking sides about the
recent, unprecedented burst of prosecutions for leaking, and this
under a president who had promised unparalleled transparency,
we effectively side with rampant executive secrecy. 13
Y. CONCLUSIONS
Taken together, the teaching of these three books is that, de
facto if not de jure, we have a monarchical Constitution, and it's
a good thing, too. They make a strong case for the ineffectiveness,
today at least, of Madisonian restraints on executive power. Their
complacency about our politics and disdain for the rule of law
remain somewhat mystifying. Veneration for our "democracy"
and the presidency are commonplace, but usually packaged with
veneration for the Constitution and the rule of law. Our authors
are sophisticated enough to see the tensions within this package.
Political scientists Nelson and Sagar preserve most of the package
by reading the Constitution as monarchical, with the prince above
the law. Ironically, it is the law professors, Posner & Vermeule,
who cast aside the legalist niceties of Madison's Constitution in
favor of one advocated by the Nazi Carl Schmitt. Perhaps this is
an unintended consequence of the debunking achieved by the
Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies movements, which
explored the workings of power under the guise of law. Neither
law and economics rationalism nor classical republican thought
seems to offer a satisfying account of those workings today.
31. See also SCOTI HORTON, LORDS OF SECRECY: THE NATIONAL SECURITY ELITE
AND AMERICA'S STEALTH WARFARE (2015).
32. Jack Goldsmith, Secrecy and Safety, THE NEW RI'PUBLIC, Aug. 13, 200X, at 35
(reviewing ERIC LlCIITBLAU, BUSH'S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE
(200X)).
33. See also CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE 0BAMA'S POST-9/11
PRESIDENCY (2015).
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Clearly, the Constitution inscribes the value of robust,
effective government. Equally clearly, it inscribes restraints on
overconcentration of power and respect for individual freedom.
These books honor the first commitment, but disrniss the others
as unnecessary. In place of goals always in profound tension, they
offer us laurels for a virtuous monarchy. Neither history nor
political science warrants this move. Their core claims are
speculative, unrealistic and of dubious provenance: to wit, James
I, Carl Schmitt and Machiavelli, respectively.
Skeptics are left to mull a problematic array of hard-todispute facts: a world of far-extended American power constantly
under threat; a long list of emergency executive actions, ostensibly
34
justified by highly classified information ; mainstream media that
often fail to discover or to closely question these naoves; a public
in position to find fault with such actions only when putatively
unlawful leaks occur; a new practice of systematic indictment of
leakers who oppose government policy; presidents that,
regardless of party, generally work to maintain and expand
executive powers, securing immunity from legal process for high35
level abusers, including their political enemies ; repeated
congressional authorization of measures that value security over
liberty 36 ; a Court that interprets secrecy as an executive power
rather than a First Amendment issue, 37 and free speech as
whatever speech money can buy, 3x leaks excepted; an education
system focused more on vocational training than on critical
thinking; an influential dogma of American exceptionalism that
teaches "my country, right or wrong"; a public especially revering
wartime presidents like Lincoln and FDR, who did whatever they
deemed necessary; a public fascinated with Britain's royals and
accustomed to dynasties named Kennedy, Bush, and Clinton; a
public whose constitutional sentiments often are vague, yet
polarized; and a public that typically, in low-turnout,
34. Drone killings and the invasion of Iraq arc examples or varying scale and
visibility.
35. Though President Obama acknowledges that crimes such as torture were
commiLLcd during the Bush administration's war on terror, his administration has not
prosecuted those ultimately responsible; it agrees with the doctrine that high officials
generally have at least qualified immunity from civil and criminal liability; it invokes the
state secrets and executive privilege doctrines to withhold relevant d1JCumcnts, including
legal advice memos, from domestic and international tribunals; and it hinders Congress
from investigating and publicizing such abuses.
3fi. For example, sweeping surveillance and indefinite detention without trial, under
the Patriot Act and Authorization for Usc of Military Force Resolution (2001 ).
37. See, e.g., Sncpp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (19HO).
3X. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 55X U.S. 310 (2010).
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gerrymandered elections, reelects most members of Congress,
despite professing contempt for its ineffectual operations, while
often perpetuating the very gridlock that it disdains.
One may question whether we inhabit a vibrant democracy,
or something closer to the late Roman republic. Then, we may
contemplate the sobering possibility of a constitutional
Convention larded with neo-monarchist delegates, perhaps
influenced by books like these. Many calls for a new constitutional
Convention under Article V have been submitted to Congress.
Most were expressly aimed at a narrow, specific amendment,
though it is quite possible that, if convened, a Convention would
feel free to propose whatever changes it pleased, or even an
entirely new Constitution. Congress has so far chosen not to
tabulate together the dozens of Convention calls from different
eras or specifying different topics. If it did, or if only five more
states endorse the call for a balanced budget amendment,
Congress would be obliged to call a Convention and to specify,
without constitutional guidance, the terms for selecting delegates.
We would then find out what the delegates want; that is not
to say that we would find out what the American people want.
The ancient Hebrews, it is said, desired a king; what Americans
want today is hard to know. How and when the People can speak
remains an essentially contested question of constitutional theory.
Academics have always debated the Constitution's meaning;
these three books raise the deeper question: at this point, in what
sense do we really have a Constitution at all? Through different
avenues, they find legally unchecked power in the president,
making his/her wisdom and virtue our primary safeguard. We the
People, ostensibly sovereign, seem to have great difficulty
ascertaining what the Constitution prescribes, when and how it
changes, whether our leaders are virtuous, or even what they are
actually doing. Are we truly a constitutional republic, or have
we-without a coup, formal amendment or transformative Court
decision- been stripped of that advantage and reduced to
lawlessness, by constitutional stealth?

